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Summary
In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, subsequent anthrax
incidents, and occasional warnings of terrorist reprisals in response to U.S.
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, federal policymakers have given renewed
attention to continuity of operations (COOP) issues.  COOP planning is a segment
of federal government contingency planning that refers to the internal effort of an
organization, such as a branch of government, department, or office, to assure that
the capability exists to continue essential operations in the aftermath of a
comprehensive array of potential operational interruptions.  It is related to continuity
of government (COG) planning. COG plans are designed to ensure survival of a
constitutional form of government and the continuity of essential federal functions.
This report does not discuss COG planning beyond any direct relationship to COOP
planning.
Government-wide, COOP planning is critical because much of the recovery
from an incident, which might include the maintenance of civil authority, and
infrastructure repair, among other recovery activities, presumes the existence of an
ongoing, functional government to fund, support, and oversee actions taken.  In the
executive branch, COOP planning can be viewed as a continuation of basic
emergency preparedness planning, and a bridge between that planning and efforts to
maintain continuity of government in the event of a significant disruption to
government activity or institutions.  Because the number and types of potential
interruptions are unknown, effective COOP planning must provide, in advance of an
incident, a variety of means to assure contingent operations.
This report discusses the background of COOP planning, discusses elements of
an effective COOP plan, and reviews the current policies governing COOP planning
in the executive branch.  The final two sections address issues and policy questions,
including, among other matters, the status of agency preparedness, maintaining
COOP preparedness, congressional committee oversight of COOP activity, and
funding for contingency planning.  
This report is one of several CRS products related to government contingency
planning, and will be updated as events warrant.  COOP planning in Congress is
addressed in CRS Report RL31594, Congressional Continuity of Operations (COOP): An
Overview of Concepts and Challenges.  CRS Report RL31739, Federal Agency Emergency
Preparedness and Dismissal of Employees, discusses pre-COOP activities relating to the
safeguarding of federal personnel and evacuation of federal buildings.  For a more
comprehensive analysis of COG, see CRS Report RS21089, Continuity of
Government: Current Federal Arrangements and the Future. 
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1 Another term that is sometimes used to describe COG activities is enduring constitutional
government (ECG).  The terms appear to describe similar activities described in presidential
national security documents described in footnote 11.  This report does not discuss ECG or
COG planning beyond any direct relationship to COOP planning.  For a more
comprehensive analysis of COG, see CRS Report RS21089, Continuity of Government:
Current Federal Arrangements and the Future, by Harold C. Relyea.
2 A cyber attack is an incursion on a range of IT facilities, and can range from simply
penetrating a system and examining it for the challenge, thrill, or interest, to entering a
system for revenge, to steal information, extort money, cause deliberate localized harm to
computers, or damage to a much larger infrastructure, such as telecommunications facilities.
See CRS Report RL30735, Cyberwarfare, by Steven A. Hildreth and CRS Report RL31787,
Information Warfare and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues, by Clay
Wilson.
Continuity of Operations (COOP) in the
Executive Branch: Background and Issues
for Congress
Introduction
In the wake of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, subsequent anthrax
incidents, and occasional warnings of potential terrorist reprisals in response to U.S.
interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, policymakers have given renewed attention to
continuity of operations (COOP) issues.  COOP planning is a segment of federal
government contingency planning linked to continuity of government (COG).  Taken
together, COOP and COG are designed to ensure survival of a constitutional form of
government and the continuity of essential federal functions.  In the executive branch,
COG planning efforts focused on preserving the line of presidential succession, by
safeguarding officials who would succeed the President.1
COOP planning refers to the internal effort of an organization, such as a branch
of government, department, or office, to assure that the capability exists to continue
essential operations in response to a comprehensive array of potential operational
interruptions.  While much of the renewed impetus for COOP planning focuses on
responding to potential attack, operational interruptions that could necessitate the
activation of a COOP might also include routine building renovation or maintenance;
mechanical failure of heating or other building systems; fire; and inclement weather
or other acts of nature.  Other events which may interrupt government activity
include failure of information technology (IT) and telecommunications installations
due to malfunction or cyber attack.2
Government-wide, COOP planning is critical because much of the response to
an incident might include the maintenance of civil authority and infrastructure repair,
among other recovery activities.  It presumes the existence of an ongoing, functional
CRS-2
3 See CRS Report RL31739, Federal Agency Emergency Preparedness and Dismissal of
Employees, by L. Elaine Halchin.
4 When an incident occurs, COOP or COG plans may be activated independently or in
concert, depending on the type and severity of the event.
5 Although elements of COOP plans are available for some agencies, full plans detailing all
potential responses are not public information, given their sensitive, contingent status.
6 Under the Presidential Succession Act of 1947, as amended (61 Stat. 380, 3 U.S.C. 19),
the current line of presidential succession passes from the President to the Vice President,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, President Pro Tempore of the Senate, Secretaries
of State, the Treasury, and Defense, the Attorney General, and the secretaries of the Interior,
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government to fund, support, and oversee recovery efforts.  In the executive branch,
COOP planning can be viewed as a continuation of basic emergency preparedness
planning, including evacuation planning,3 and serves as a bridge between that
planning and efforts to maintain continuity of government in the event of a
significant disruption to government activity or institutions.4  In the aftermath of an
incident, initial efforts typically focus on safeguarding personnel and securing the
incident scene.  Subsequently, attention focuses on reestablishing critical agency
operations according to a COOP plan.  Because the number and types of potential
interruptions are unknown, effective COOP planning must provide, in advance of an
incident, a variety of means to assure contingent operations.
Arrangements for the contingent operation of the executive branch in the event
of a national emergency, catastrophe, or other operational interruption are specified
in law, policy, and agency plans.  These sources identify a number of matters that
agency COOP planners must incorporate into their planning.  In practice, the
specialized nature of the various agencies of the executive branch results in COOP
planning that is highly decentralized, with each agency developing specific plans5
appropriate for maintaining its operations in an emergency.  COOP planning is also
driven in part by growth and change of mission critical needs, personnel, and
information systems within an agency.
The next section of this report discusses the background of COOP planning,
elements of an effective COOP plan, and reviews the current policies governing
COOP planning in the executive branch.  The final two sections address issues and
policy questions, including matters of the status of agency preparedness, maintaining
COOP preparedness, congressional committee oversight of COOP activity, and
funding for contingency planning.
Background
Continuity of operations planning grows out of efforts established during the
Cold War to preserve the continuity of government in the event of a nuclear attack
on the United States.  At the time, executive branch COG planning focused on
preserving the line of presidential succession, by safeguarding officials who would
succeed the President.  Also, COG plans reportedly included locating and evacuating
the officials in the line of succession,6 along with the other senior leaders of cabinet
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Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, Health and Human Services, Housing and Urban
Development, Transportation, Energy, Education, and Veterans Affairs.  Legislation
pending before the 108th Congress (S. 148, introduced by Senator DeWine, and H.R. 1354,
introduced by Representative Tom Davis), would include the Secretary of Homeland
Security in the line of succession.  For more information on presidential succession, see
CRS Report RL31761, Presidential and Vice Presidential Succession: Overview and
Current Legislation, by Thomas H. Neale.
7 See Edward Zuckerman, The Day After World War III, (New York: Viking, 1984), pp. 44-
66, 211-238; Ted Gup, “The Doomsday Plan,” Time, Aug. 10, 1992, pp. 32-39; and Bruce
G. Blair, John E. Pike and Stephen I. Schwartz, “Emergency Command Posts and the
Continuity of Government,” in Stephen I. Schwartz, Atomic Audit: The Costs and
Consequences of U.S. Nuclear Weapons Since 1940, (Washington: Brookings Institution
Press, 1998), pp. 210-214.
Similar contingency plans were reportedly developed for Congress and the Supreme
Court.  See Ibid.; Ted Gup, “The Last Resort,” Washington Post Magazine, May 31, 1992,
pp. 11, 13-15, 24-27; Kenneth J. Cooper, “Hill Leaders ‘Regret’ Reports on Bomb Shelter
Site,” Washington Post, May 30, 1992, pp. A1.  For an overview of congressional COOP
planning, see CRS Report RL31594, Congressional Continuity of Operations (COOP): An
Overview of Concepts and Challenges, by R. Eric Petersen and Jeffrey W. Seifert.
8 See Dipka Bhambhani, “Crisis Proves a Need for Disaster Planning,” Government
Computer News, Sept. 24, 2001, p.1; Dana Milbank, “Worst-Case Scenarios: The U.S. Has
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departments, and leaders of the independent agencies, such as the Federal Reserve.
In the event of an imminent nuclear attack, the plans called for the relocation of these
individuals to secure, alternative operational facilities outside of the District of
Columbia.7
As COG plans evolved, it was recognized by emergency planners that it would
be necessary to support the country’s senior leadership and to carry out critical
functions in the aftermath of an attack, regardless of the need to evacuate and relocate
government officials.  Consequently, COOP planning became a unifying element that
integrated support functions in situations where the lack of such basic support
elements as personnel, alternative operational facilities, or records, posed serious
disruption to agency operations and the ability of the government to carry out its
constitutional and statutory duties.
In the period following the end of the Cold War, attention to contingency
planning reportedly decreased in response to the perception of diminished risk of
widespread interruption to government operations as a result of an intercontinental
nuclear attack.  In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon, federal government facilities in Washington, DC,
were evacuated.  The government resumed normal operations on September 12.  As
a result of that experience, some federal agency leaders recognized that if they were
prevented from reentering their facilities for longer periods of time, existing
contingency plans, based on Cold War era assumptions that included a period of
warning before an attack, were inadequate protection in a threat environment
characterized by potential sudden, localized terrorist attacks that could include the
use of weapons of mass destruction.8
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None; Constitutional Crisis, Chaos Foreseen if Top Leaders Killed,” Washington Post, Dec.
10, 2001 p. A1; and Sue Anne Pressley and Start S. Hsu, “A 2-Front War on Terror at
Home,” Washington Post, Mar. 16, 2003, p. A1.
9 Section 503 (1) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (P.L. 107-296) transfers FEMA, its
responsibilities, assets, and liabilities to the Emergency Preparedness and Response
Directorate of the new Department of Homeland Security (DHS).  The transfer was effective
Mar. 1, 2003.  For more information regarding the transfer, see CRS Report RL31670,
Transfer of FEMA to the Department of Homeland Security: Issues for Congressional
Oversight, by Keith Bea.
10 Information regarding PDD 67 was obtained from the Federation of American Scientists
(FAS) Intelligence Resources Program, which provides declassified materials and
summaries of some current national security documents through the Internet.  The FAS
summary for PDD 67 is available at [http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-67.htm].
11 PDD 67 replaced George H. W. Bush’s National Security Directive (NSD) 69, “Enduring
Constitutional Government” issued June 2, 1992, which in turn succeeded NSD 37
“Enduring Constitutional Government” issued Apr. 18, 1990.  National Security Decision
Directives (NSDD) 47 “Emergency Mobilization Preparedness,” issued July 22, 1982, and
NSDD 55, “Enduring National Leadership,” issued Sept. 14, 1982, by President Ronald
Reagan, included consideration of continued government operations  planning.  See
Christopher Simpson, National Security Directives of the Reagan and Bush Administrations:
The Declassified History of U.S. Political and Military Policy, 1981-1991 (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press), pp. 59, 71, 102-104, and 158-178.  Earlier national security directives
relating to continuity of government include:  Presidential Directive (PD) 58, “Continuity
of Government,”issued June 30, 1980, by President Jimmy Carter; two National Security
Decision Memoranda (NSDM) issued by President Richard Nixon, NSDM 201,
“Contingency Planning,” issued Jan. 5, 1973, and NSDM 8, “Crisis Anticipation and
Management,” issued Mar. 21, 1969, and two National Security Acton Memoranda (NSAM)
issued by President John F. Kennedy, NSAM 166, “Report on Emergency Plans and
Continuity of the Government,” issued June 25, 1962, and NSAM 127, “Emergency
Planning for Continuity of Government,” issued Feb. 14, 1962. The initial national security
document establishing continuity programs appears to be NSC 5521,  “NSC Relocation
Plan,” issued some time in 1955, by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
12 Ibid.
COOP Planning Authority
COOP planning is carried out under the authority of security classified
presidential national security directives, and publicly available executive orders.  The
current documents governing contingency planning activity include Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) 67, Enduring Constitutional Government and Continuity
of Government Operations, and Executive Order (E.O.) 12656, Assignment of
Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities.  A series of Federal Emergency
Management Agency (FEMA)9 documents provide guidance for preparing and
exercising COOP plans.
Presidential Decision Directive 67.  PDD 6710 was reportedly issued by
the Clinton Administration on October 21, 1998.11  The directive reportedly requires
federal agencies to develop COOP plans for essential operations.12  FEMA’s Federal
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13 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FPC 65, “Federal Executive Branch Continuity
of Operations (COOP),” July 26, 1999.
14 53 FR 47491; Nov. 23, 1988.
15While the order defines “national security emergency” broadly, subsequent language
excludes “those natural disasters, technological emergencies, or other emergencies, the
alleviation of which is normally the responsibility of individuals, the private sector,
volunteer organizations, State and local governments, and Federal departments and agencies
unless such situations also constitute a national security emergency.”
Preparedness Circular (FPC) 6513 identifies PDD-67 as the authority establishing
FEMA as the “executive agent for federal executive branch COOP.”  In response to
the presidential directive, some federal agencies reportedly formed task forces of
representatives who were familiar with agency operations and contingency planning
to develop COOP plans.  The plans reportedly identify those requirements necessary
to support the primary function of an agency, such as emergency communications,
establishing a chain of command, and delegation of authority.  The full text of the
PDD 67 is security classified, and no official summary or other information about the
directive has been released.
Executive Order 12656.  E.O. 12656, Assignment of Emergency
Preparedness Responsibilities was issued November 18, 1988 by President Ronald
Reagan.14  It assigns national security emergency preparedness responsibilities to
federal departments and agencies.  E.O.12656 defines a national security emergency
as “any occurrence, including natural disaster, military attack, technological
emergency, or other emergency, that seriously degrades or seriously threatens the
national security of the United States.15  Although the order does not explicitly refer
to continuity of operations, it specifies preparedness functions and activities to
include the development of policies, plans, procedures, and readiness measures that
enhance the ability of the United States Government to mobilize for, respond to, and
recover from a national security emergency.
Under the order, agencies are required to have capabilities to meet essential
defense and civilian needs in the event of a national security emergency.  This
capability is to be developed according to a three step planning process which
encompasses identification of functions that would have to be performed by an
agency during a national security emergency; the development of plans for
performing those functions; and development and maintenance of the capability to
execute those plans. 
E.O. 12656 designates the National Security Council (NSC) as the principal
forum for consideration of national security emergency preparedness policy.  The
order also requires the director of FEMA to “serve as an advisor to the National
Security Council on issues of national security emergency preparedness, including
mobilization preparedness, civil defense, continuity of government, technological
disasters, and other issues, as appropriate.”  FEMA is also required to assist in the
implementation of preparedness policies by coordinating with the other federal
departments and agencies and with state and local governments.
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16These documents include Acts of Congress, presidential proclamations, executive orders,
regulations, and notices of other actions.
Section 201 of the order charges the head of each federal agency to
! be prepared to respond adequately to all national security emergencies;
! consider national security emergency preparedness factors in the conduct of
regular agency functions;
! appoint a senior policy official as emergency coordinator, with responsibility
for developing and maintaining a multi-year, national security emergency
preparedness plan for the agency;
! design preparedness measures to permit a rapid and effective transition from
routine to emergency operations;
! base national security emergency preparedness measures on the use of existing
authorities, organizations, resources, and systems, to the maximum extent practicable;
! identify areas where additional legal authorities may be needed to assist
management and, consistent with applicable executive orders, take appropriate
measures toward acquiring those authorities;
! make policy recommendations to the NSC regarding national security
emergency preparedness activities and functions of the federal government;
! coordinate with state and local government agencies and private sector
organizations, when appropriate;
! assist state, local, and private sector entities in developing plans for providing
services that are essential to a national response;
! cooperate in compiling, evaluating, and exchanging relevant data related to all
aspects of national security emergency preparedness;
! develop programs regarding congressional relations and public information
that could be used during national security emergencies;
! ensure a capability to provide, during a national security emergency,
information concerning official government documents16 to the official or
agency designated to maintain the Federal Register in an emergency;
! develop and conduct training and education programs that incorporate
emergency preparedness and civil defense information necessary to ensure an
effective national response;
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17 For example, Section 301(1) requires the Department of Agriculture to “develop plans to
provide for the continuation of agricultural production, food processing, storage, and
distribution through the wholesale level in national security emergencies, and to provide for
the domestic distribution of seed, feed, fertilizer, and farm equipment to agricultural
producers.”  Section 801(1) requires the Department of Health and Human Services to
“develop national plans and programs to mobilize the health industry and health resources
for the provision of health, mental health, and medical services in national security
emergencies.”
18 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FPC 60, “Continuity of the Executive Branch
of the Federal Government at the Headquarters Level During National Security
Emergencies,” Nov. 20, 1990; and  FPC 64, “Continuity of the Executive Branch of the
Federal Government at the Regional Level During National Security Emergencies,” Nov.
20, 1990.
19 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FPC 67, “Acquisition of Alternate Facilities for
Continuity of Operations (COOP),” Apr. 30, 2001.
20 Federal Emergency Management Agency, FPC 66, “Test, Training and Exercise (TT&E)
Program for Continuity Of Operations (COOP),” Apr. 30, 2001.
! ensure that plans consider the consequences for essential services provided by
state and local governments, and by the private sector, if the disbursement of
federal funds is disrupted; and 
! consult and coordinate with the director of FEMA to ensure that agency
emergency preparedness activities and plans are consistent with NSC
guidelines and policies.
Section 202 of E.O. 12656 requires the head of each federal department and
agency to “ensure the continuity of essential functions in any national security
emergency by providing for: succession to office and emergency delegation of
authority in accordance with applicable law; safekeeping of essential resources,
facilities, and records; and establishment of emergency operating capabilities.”
Whenever possible, the order based emergency planning on extensions of the regular
missions of the departments and agencies.  Subsequent sections require each
department to carry out specific contingency planning activities in its areas of policy
responsibility.17
Role of FEMA.  As the lead agency for COOP planning, FEMA has the
responsibility to formulate guidance for agencies to use in developing viable,
executable COOP plans; facilitate interagency coordination as appropriate; and
oversee and assess the status of COOP capability across the federal executive branch.
Toward those ends, FEMA issued several federal preparedness circulars (FPCs) to
provide guidance to federal executive branch departments and agencies for use in
developing their COOP plans.  The circulars address a range of issues, including
ensuring the ability of agencies to continue operations at the headquarters and
regional levels during an operational interruption;18 provisions for acquiring
alternative facilities;19 and requirements that COOP plans are maintained through a
continuous process of testing and training.20
CRS-8
COOP Plan Elements
Although the specific details of a COOP plan will vary by agency, FEMA
guidance suggests that executive branch COOP planners incorporate several common
components in their COOP planning.  These components include the ability to
maintain any plan at a high level of readiness which could be capable of
implementation both with and without warning of an interruption of routine
operations.  FEMA suggests that COOP plans should be operational no later than 12
hours after activation, and that they provide for sustained agency operations for up
to 30 days.  To the extent that such facilities are available, COOP planners are
advised to take maximum advantage of existing agency field infrastructures.  FEMA
recommends that agencies develop and maintain their COOP capabilities using a
multi-year strategy and program management plan.  The plan could outline the
process the agency will follow to designate essential functions and resources, define
short and long-term COOP goals and objectives, forecast budgetary requirements,
anticipate and address issues and potential obstacles, and establish planning
milestones.  A completed COOP plan would likely incorporate several elements,
including:
! identification of an agency’s essential functions which must continue under
all circumstances;
! stipulation of agency lines of succession and delegation of authorities;
! provisions for the use of alternate facilities;
! establishment of emergency operating procedures;
! establishment of reliable, interoperable communications;
! provisions for the safekeeping of vital records and databases;
! provisions for logistical support;
! personnel issues;
! security measures for personnel, records and alternate facilities; and 
! development of exercises and training programs to assure the effectiveness of
COOP planning.
The sensitive nature of contingency planning, and the specialized nature of
government agencies are factors in the lack of publicly available detailed agency-by-
agency information regarding the extent of COOP planning.  In the winter of 2001-
2002, however,  President George W. Bush issued several executive orders providing
for an order of succession in the executive departments and the Environmental
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21 E.O. 13241, “Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department of Agriculture,”
Dec. 18, 2001, 66 FR 66258; E.O. 13242, “Providing an Order of Succession Within the
Department of Commerce,” Dec. 18, 2001, 66 FR 66260; E.O. 13243, “Providing an Order
of Succession Within the Department of Housing and Urban Development,” Dec. 18, 2001,
66 FR 66262; E.O. 13244, “Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department of the
Interior,” Dec. 18, 2001, 66 FR 66267; E.O. 13245, “Providing an Order of Succession
Within the Department of Labor,” Dec. 18, 2001, 66 FR 66268; E.O. 13246, “Providing an
Order of Succession Within the Department of the Treasury,” Dec. 18, 2001, 66 FR 66270;
E.O. 13247, “Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department of Veterans Affairs,”
Dec. 18, 2001, 66 FR 66271; E.O. 13250, “Providing an Order of Succession Within the
Department of Health and Human Services,” Dec. 28, 2001, 67 FR 1597; E.O. 13250,
“Providing an Order of Succession Within the Department of Health and Human Services,”
Dec. 28, 2001, 67 FR 1597; E.O. 13251, “Providing an Order of Succession Within the
Department of State,” Dec. 28, 2001, 67 FR 1599; and E.O. 13261, “Providing an Order of
Succession in the Environmental Protection Agency and Amending Certain Orders on
Succession,” Mar. 19, 2002, 67 FR 13243.  There does not appear to be a similar executive
order specifying succession in the Department of Homeland Security.
22 See United States, Department of Energy, National Nuclear Security Administration,
NAP-2, “Establishment of Line of Succession for the Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration,” May 21, 2002.  Available on the Internet at
[http://www.nnsa.doe.gov/docs/NAP-2.htm]. Also, United States, Department of
Transportation, Federal Highway Administration, FHWA Order M 1100.1a, FHWA
Delegations and Organization Manual, Part I, Chapter 2, “Order of Succession,” Sept. 30,
2002.  See [http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/legsregs/directives/orders/m1100.1a/doa_ch02.htm]
on the Internet.
Protection Agency.21  In addition, some agencies within departments have also
established leadership succession contingencies as part of their COOP planning.22
Issues
Policy questions and issues will likely arise as Congress examines the status
of COOP planning within the executive branch of the federal government and the
implications of that planning for overall agency emergency preparedness.  Some of
the issues regarding COOP planning include:
Issue Immediacy.  As the memory of dramatic interruptions such as the
September 11 attacks and anthrax incidents fade, attention to administrative
operations like COOP planning may receive lower priority attention from agency
planners.  Emergency preparedness observers note that the success of contingency
planning is dependent on current planning and regular drills, simulations, or other
testing.  Prior to the attacks, executive branch COOP management by NSC and
FEMA and guidance for other executive branch agencies were all in place, and that
guidance included requirements for agency-wide staff education, as well as the
testing and drilling of COOP plans.  Nevertheless, on September 11, 2001 some
federal employees reportedly were unaware of these plans, and some agencies found
they had no way of accounting for, or communicating with, evacuated staff.
Congressional Committee Jurisdiction.  Government operations in the
executive branch are generally overseen by the House Committee on Government
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23 Tom Davis, Chairman, House Committee on Government Reform, “Committee on
Government Reform Oversight Plan, 108th Congress,” undated, pp. 3-4.  The document is
available on the Internet at [http://www.house.gov/reform/108th_oversight_plan.pdf].
Reform and the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs.  In the House
committee’s oversight plan for the 108th Congress, the committee’s chairman, Rep.
Tom Davis of Virginia, indicated that the committee might “work with essential
government agencies to make sure they have contingency plans in place in case of a
major disruption.”23  In addition, the Select Committee on Homeland Security
appears to have both oversight and legislative responsibility regarding the
Department of Homeland Security during the 108th Congress (This jurisdiction is not
exclusive, and referral of legislation relating to the department is decided on a case
by case basis.).  The transfer of FEMA to the new department may give the select
committee some role in overseeing the guidance and implementation of COOP
planning.  Finally, the specialized nature of various agencies’ missions may also lead
to COOP oversight being carried out by the authorizing committees most familiar
with specific agency operations.
Budgetary Constraints.  The current budgetary environment is
characterized by limited resources, coupled with increased demand for a variety of
homeland security protective measures, including executive branch COOP planning.
A possible consequence of the acquisition of technology, infrastructure, and supplies
to be held in reserve for use in an emergency, is the likelihood that such an allocation
might reduce resources available for routine operations.
Policy Questions
Executive branch COOP planning raise several questions related to
underlying policy matters.  Some of these question include:
! How are COOP plans maintained?  Where are they physically, and what
provisions are in place for accessing plans in the event of an interruption?
! Government-wide, what is the general level of preparedness to carry out
COOP plans?
! What plans do departments and agencies of the executive, branch have in
place to ensure that they can continue to carry out their constitutional and
statutory duties in the event of an incident that could potentially disrupt those
operations for undetermined periods of time?    Which agencies have
established effective COOP programs?  How have those plans been
implemented or exercised and practiced?
! How have various plans been upgraded in the aftermath of the autumn, 2001
attacks?  Have those plans been evaluated?  By what organizations?
! Because COOP plans are typically customized to preserve an agency’s unique
operational needs, how can effective COOP planning be evaluated?  What
standards are imposed?
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! What are the costs of establishing offsite facilities for use as emergency
offices, alternate computing facilities, or securing office equipment and
supplies in an emergency?
! What has been the effect of COOP planning on day-to-day personnel and
technological management?
! What are the implications of COOP planning in relation to record keeping and
archiving of paper-based and electronic information?
! Has FEMA been effective in supporting agencies as they develop their COOP
plans?  What are the consequences of incorporating FEMA into the
Department of Homeland security for government-wide COOP management
and administration?
! Is legislation needed to adjust respective agency roles as a result of the
creation of the Department of Homeland Security?
In considering issues related to conducting oversight of executive branch
COOP planing, Congress may examine strategies that could balance congressional
responsibilities while maintaining the operational security of executive COOP plans.
Some of the options for pursuing oversight include the potential use of congressional
staff to conduct evaluation and investigation; holding  congressional hearings after
determining whether such hearings should be open or closed to the public; and the
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